

O 164 0002 1940

Not used Mr Tannenwar

Hakko Ichi

Defense Document 626A-7

Extract from  
Interrogation of TOJO, Hideki  
14 January 1946  
p. 6 & 7

- Q. Is there a slogan, attributed to the First Emperor, that the eight corners of the earth should be under one roof?
- A. Yes, there is.
- Q. Was it the slogan of Japanese militarists and people who wanted Japan to expand?
- A. Yes, it was used.
- Q. Prior to the Manchurian Incident, from 1925 to 1931 and then on, there were members of the Army, officers, who had that slogan and believed that Japan should expand accordingly into Asia and Oceania?
- A. That idea was misunderstood by the people. It had a spiritual meaning. The people of Japan misinterpreted that slogan, and I and the other responsible leaders intended the slogan in a spiritual sense of spreading virtue throughout the four seas and holding to virtue in relations with other countries.
- Q. Do you know that it is true and a fact that, despite the meaning you have, many of the officers put a realistic and practical meaning on it to expand and to dominate and to control the people politically?
- A. The responsible leaders were the ones that gave it this spiritual interpretation, but there were some of the people who misinterpreted it.

Def Document 626A-7 Cont'd

- Q. There was a large group among the Army officers who put the practical meaning on it, wasn't there?
- A. Generally, there may have been some of the Army officers who also had this mistaken interpretation.
- Q. Do you know of any Army officers who did put the practical, hardboiled meaning to it?
- A. There may have been such people, but when you ask me who believed that, I can't answer it.
- Q. Did you ever meet any Army officers who were among that class?
- A. I didn't specifically go up and ask people if they had a mistaken idea of this thing. I have the impression from newspapers and various things that I have read that there were some people who had this mistaken view.
- Q. Those who took the spiritual interpretation of the sentence felt that it would be better for any or all people to live under Japanese rule and thus attain the proper peace and spiritual relation in living?
- A. That is not true. Such a thought never even entered their heads. In addition to that, as a practical matter, it was impossible. Their understanding of it was that relations between various countries should be conducted on the basis of virtue. That was the meaning.
- Q. Do you place along the lines of virtue, international law?
- A. The idea of following international law is included in that spiritual interpretation of it. (At this point General TOJO brought forth a small notebook which he carried in his pocket and from it the interpreter read as follows:)

Def Document 626A-7 Cont'd

"November 5, 1943 - Preamble of the Declaration published by the Greater East Asia Convention. It is fundamental for the establishment of the world that each nation of the world obtain its proper place, and that all countries share in common the fruits of universal prosperity in a spirit of mutual dependence and mutual help." This is a basic requirement for the establishment of world peace -- each person having his proper place in the universe.

- Q. Do you mean that each nation, including Japan, should have its sphere of influence and that to obtain it, the status quo should be changed?
- A. It means that each country should be able to live in its own sphere and that trade and other relations with other countries should be of mutual benefit.

*not used*

DLE LOC # 626 A-7

帝國國會六二六年一七

東洋英機訊問拔萃

一九四六年一月十四日 六、七丁

問 問 問 問 問 問

神武天皇の稱へられた八<sup>ハシ</sup>一字といふ標語がありますか？奴<sup>イ</sup>あります。

それ故日本の軍隊、遠くは日本の仲戻を欲する人々の標語となりま

したか？

たれ、使なれました。

問 問 問 問 問 問

新舊事變が大立つて、一九二五年から一九三一年迄とその後も、  
その標語を藉へ、それに従つて東洋及大洋洲へ日本は仲戻すべきで  
あると信じた軍人、即ち將校達がありましたか？その考へは國民に誤解されたのです。それは精神的の意味を持つて  
居たのです。

日本の國民はその標語を誤つて解釋したのです。私と他の責任あ

Dkr DDC # 626 A-7 continued

## 答　問

る指導者達は、その標語を、四海を貫じて徳を弘め、他國との關係に於て徳を保持するといふ精神的觀念に於て意識したのです。あなたのその考にも拘はらず、多くの將校は、伸展と國民を政治的に支配、統御するといふ現實的な、又實際的な意味をそれに與へたといふことが本旨であり、又事實であることを知つて居ますか責任ある指導者達はこれに精神的解釋を與へた者達ですが、然し國民中にはこれを誤つて解釋した人々が居るのです。

DEF DOC # 626 A-7 continued

問、陸軍將校の中には、それに實際的な意味を附け加へた大きな一派があつたのでせうね。

答、一般的にいひますと、陸軍將校の中にこういふ間違つた解釋をしてゐた者もあつたかも知れません、

問、貴方ねさういつた實際上の偏強な意味をそのスローガンに附けた陸軍將校が居た事を知つてありますか、

答、さういふ者が居たかも知れませんが、しかしさういふ者がいたといふ事を誰が信じてゐたかと聞はれると私は答へる事が出来ません、

問、貴方ねさういふ派の中にゐた陸軍將校に會つた事がありますか、

答、私は特別に立入つて、殖民にこの事についての間違つた觀念を持つてゐるかどうか尋ねては見ませんでした。私は新聞やその他の讀んだ色々の物からこういふ間違つた考を有つた者が殖民の中にくらかあつたといふ感じを持つだけです、

問、其の文についてかゝる精神的な解釋をとり入れた者は誰で、誰れでもすべて殖民が日本の縛に従つて生活をし、ひいては眞の平和を獲得し生活上に精神上との體験を導いた方がいいのではないかと考へたの

DEF DOC # 626 A-7 continued

ですね。

答、さうではありません、さういふ考は彼等の口の中に当然なかつたのです。之れに加へて、尙實際問題としてさういふ考はより得をいた事であります。彼等の解釋はといへば諸國家間の關係の徹底に徹底に基いて行はれなければならないといふのであつて却々これがそのスローガンの意味であつたのです。

問、貴方は徳義の問題に則つて國際法といふものを考へて居るのですか。  
答、國際法に則るといふ考は前に云つた精神上の解釋の中に含まれてゐます、  
（こゝで東條大將はバケツに入れてきた手控を取り出した。通訳は  
その中から次の様に讀んだ。）

昭和十八年十一月五日

大東亜宣言 前文

抑々世界各國が各々その所を得相倚り相扶けて萬物共榮の樂を有にするは世界平和確立の根本要義なり」此れは各個人が各自世界にその處を導ることであり世界平和確立の爲の滅本的要素であります。

問 それは日本を含む各國がその努力團を所有すべきで、之が爲め現状維持に變更するべきかと云ふ意味ですか

答 それ以各國が自國の領分内で至きるべさで交易共用外國との間のものは互恵的であるべきたゞの眞理です。

164 0002 1948

Def. Doc. No. 626-A-8

Ex 3336



EXCERPTS FROM THE INTERROGATION OF

TŌJŌ HIDEKI

7 February 1946

A. ...Under the Japanese Constitution, the Army Chief of Staff and the Navy Chief of Staff are responsible solely to the Emperor in matters of strategy and evaluation of the probable advantages and disadvantages [yoshiishi] of warfare. The Ministers of State, that is to say, the Premier and the Cabinet Members, are responsible to the Emperor for other governmental functions. The Ministers of State have no right to interfere with the conduct of military affairs nor have the Chiefs of Staff the right to interfere in civil matters.

Q. Then you mean that it is the responsibility of the Chiefs of Staff to advise the Emperor on the probable beneficial or ill-effects of war?

A. Yes. This is an important point about the prerogative of the command. In America it is a function of the civil government. In Japan, you might say that the two spheres of military command and civil government overlap. Matters of purely military importance are no function of the civil government; matters of purely civil importance are no function of the military command. However, the overlapping area, which includes such matters as foreign policy and decisions to go to war for example, presents problems which in practice are taken up by the Liaison Conference [Renraku Kaigi]. For example, the strategic war plan are a matter of pure strategy and were not known to the Cabinet members. I did not even know them myself.

Q. You mean that as Premier you did not even know what the war plan was?

A. In my character as Premier, I did not. I was also a member of Imperial Headquarters and a War Councillor [Iaku ni sankaku]. In these latter two capacities, I received military reports of operations plans. These were forwarded by the Chief of Staff. Incidentally, by the war plan, which I referred to a moment ago, I mean Army war plan. I did not know anything about the Navy war plan. However, the fact that I received reports did not mean that I had the right to interfere or participate in matters involving command. These were the sole prerogative of the Chief of Staff.

13 March 1946

A. . . .This whole matter of the actual system in Japan is basic to the understanding of such things as the China Incident and the matters in southern Indo-China that we have talked about. At the first, the government policy in regard to the China Incident was that of localization. However, due to the fact of the independence of the High Command, the fighting kept spreading as they strove for victory. Premier Konoe had a terrible time.

. . . The responsibility of the Premier and the Foreign, War, and Navy Ministers, and the President of the Planning Board, together with the Chiefs of Staff, for advice to the Emperor, through the instrumentality of the Liaison Conferences and Imperial Conferences, was of tremendous importance. To return to the China Incident, for example—the Government policy was a policy of non-enlargement of the Incident; nevertheless, because of the fact that the civil government had no authority over the Supreme Command, the fighting was, in fact, enlarged and the civil government was powerless to prevent it. [This complete lack of answer was read back to the witness and he agreed as to its correctness. The attached diagram, illustrating the relationships discussed in the above interrogation, was later prepared and shown to the witness who agreed also as to its correctness.]

Q. You said yesterday that the civil government could not control the Supreme Command and gave as examples the China Incident and the situation in southern Indo-China. Would you explain how this worked in regard to southern Indo-China in 1941?

A. Well, on the one hand, the Japanese-American negotiations were under way. On the other hand, Imperial Headquarters kept moving troops and supplies from Formosa by ship to southern China and into northern Indo-China in order to win. This was something which could give rise to misunderstandings, but,

Def. Doc. No. 626-A-8

because the movement of troops and military supplies was the sole province of the Supreme Command, the civil government could say nothing. It was a different situation with regard to southern Indo-China. There, the troops were moved in on a basis of the joint defense agreement: since this involved the civil government, it could not be done by the Supreme Command alone. However, troops could be moved from central China into south China and even into the north part of French Indo-China at that time under the proper authority and at the convenience of the Supreme Command. This, of course, refers to the Army; a similar situation existed with regard to the Navy.

19 March 1946

A. . . . However, you may say that these four steps, to wit: the "Four-" and "Five-Minister" Conferences, the Liaison Conferences, the Conference for the Supreme Direction of the War, and the Imperial Headquarters Conferences, attended by the Premier, were four stages of the attempt to solve this problem of the over-lapping spheres of authority. With regard to the overlapping spheres, there was a certain amount of success, but the political forces, that is to say, the political power, of the Cabinet, could not control the pure command sphere of authority of the Supreme Command.

I am not saying that the independence of the Supreme Command is a bad thing. There are some good points about it too, for example, being able to conduct operations without political interference. It was a good thing in 1890, when the Constitution was established, for the High Command to be untrammelled, but in these days where the influence of a single nation is felt around the world, a certain amount of control by the political authorities is necessary. However, under the Japanese system, it was impossible. [The preceding portion of this answer was read back to the witness who agreed as to its correctness.]

There is one important point that I would like to make clear. I have been talking about difficult problems of the Japanese Government system and of the independence of the Supreme Command. However, the foreign problems arising from the actions of the Supreme Command, I am responsible for.

Q. So that the independence of the Supreme Command was good from a military standpoint but not good from a political or civil standpoint.

A. The independence of the Supreme Command is good from a military point of view only if fighting were the only thing to be considered, but fighting today is also a part of politics. From the political point of view, under modern conditions, the independence of the Supreme Command requires consideration. I believe that under modern conditions, war is a part of politics--they are not separate any more.

Q. Do you not realize that the position in which Japan finds herself today was due largely to the independence of the Supreme Command?

A. To speak plainly, it was a big cause. . . .

*not used*

Def. Doc. # 626 B-1

## INTERROGATION

TOJO Hideki

Time: 2 November 1946 0945 - 1100 hours

Place: Sugamo Prison

Present: General Hideki TOJO  
Mr. J. C. Howard  
Mr. T. Chiobara  
Mr. Akira Abe  
Mr. Y. Kawamoto  
Lt. D. W. Parsons  
Mr. G. F. Blewett  
Miss Helen J. Dogul  
Mr. Tameo Hongo

## Questions by Mr. Howard:

- Q. Before General TOJO became Vice Minister of War, did he and General KIMURA have any relations with each other, either business, social or political?
- A. I had no relations with KIMURA, social or political -- only on business, no social or political.
- Q. Was KIMURA Chief of the Ordnance Branch for 7 months while you were Vice Minister?
- A. Yes,
- Q. Did KIMURA have many transactions with you during this time?
- A. Yes. On business relations.
- Q. What kind of matters did KIMURA deal with at this time?
- A. Only on ordnance technical matters.
- Q. Was there a prefectural military clique from Saitama Prefecture?
- A. No, there was none.
- Q. Were there any famous military seniors from Saitama Prefecture?

Def. Doc. 626B-1

Q. Why was KIMURA appointed Commander in Chief of the Army in Burma?

A. I do not know this quite clear.

Q. Did the Vice Minister of War have the right to hire or discharge employees, either in the army or in the ministry?

A. No.

Q. Did the Vice War Minister have the authority to punish those in the army or ministry who do not obey instructions from the War Ministry?

A. The Vice Minister has not the right.

Q. Did the War Minister have the authority to punish men in the army and in the War Ministry for disobeying of instructions?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the chiefs of the bureaus in the War Ministry have the right to punish or dismiss anyone?

A. Yes.

Q. Suppose some general in the army in China disobeyed instructions from the War Ministry, who would have the authority to dismiss or punish him?

A. The authority to dismiss is in the hands of the War Minister but authority to punish is only in the hands of the Emperor. General officers may not be dismissed without permission of the Emperor.

Q. Who is directly responsible to the War Minister for the management of business in each of the bureaus and departments in the War Ministry?

A. Sometimes it comes to the War Minister directly without the Vice Minister handling it, but generally the Vice Minister must manage it. But chiefs of the bureaus and departments are responsible to the War Minister directly concerning their management of business.

Def. Doc. # 626 B-1

Page 5

- Q. Were most of the prisoner of war matters decided by the War Minister and the Chief of the Bureau without the aid of the Vice War Minister?
- A. They were decided by the Chief of the Prisoner of War Control Department.
- Q. While KIMURA was Vice War Minister, were the chiefs of the bureaus responsible to the War Minister directly?
- A. Literally speaking, chiefs of the bureaus were responsible to the War Minister directly. This is clear in the written organization.
- Q. What were the duties of the Vice War Minister?
- A. The management of the various business technical matters under the direction of the War Minister and assist War Minister and supervise business of various bureaus. This is written in the written organization of the army.
- Q. Was the Bureau of Military Affairs the center of the War Ministry and the controlling point in the War Ministry?
- A. Bureau of Military Affairs cannot be said as the center of the War Ministry because each bureau is equally subordinated to the War Minister so we cannot say Bureau of Military Affairs is the center. However, the Bureau of Military Affairs naturally assumed a very important position among the other bureaus because it can control the budget and other important matters but officially it cannot be said that it is a center of the War Ministry.
- Q. At the time KIMURA became Vice War Minister, were the War Minister and the Chief of the Bureau of Military Affairs well informed in the matters pertaining to their offices?
- A. This cannot be answered by myself, but concerning Chief of Bureau of Military Affairs, he was a very able and efficient man.
- Q. Were the chiefs of the bureaus able men and capable of handling their duties at the time KIMURA became Vice War Minister?
- A. Naturally yes.

Def. Doc. # 626 B - 1

Page 7

- Q. Are there any other former vice ministers of any ministry on trial or charged with offenses arising from their actions as Vice Minister?
- A. I cannot answer anything about former vice ministers. Generally speaking, I do not think there are. At least in the army there were none.
- Q. When KIMURA was Vice War Minister, did he attend many ceremonial functions?
- A. Yes.
- Q. In the meetings with the War Minister and Bureau Chiefs, did KIMURA take an active part?
- A. No, he was not active. The Vice Minister never could influence me.
- Q. Was it agreed between the War Minister, the Vice War Minister and the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau that almost all matters of which the Military Affairs Bureau had charge, especially the matters on policy, would be decided directly between the Minister and the Chief of the Bureau directly?
- A. There was no official agreement. However, as I mentioned before the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau has direct responsibility to the War Minister, therefore he had many decisions directly with War Minister.
- Q. Did KIMURA have anything to do with the preparations or planning of matters to be presented at a council in the Imperial presence or a Liaison conference?
- A. No.
- Q. Was KIMURA always informed as to what happened at such conferences?
- A. KIMURA had nothing to do with these conferences. Whether he got a report or not, I cannot answer.

「一」

東條英機訊問書

日 時 一九四六年十一月二日、日午前九時四十五分

至午前十一時

陪席者

東條英機大將

巢鴨拘置所

*not used*

Def Doc # 626B-1

安 部 明 氏

鹽 原 時 三 郎 氏

「J. L. ハワード」氏

「Y. 川本 氏

「D. W. バーキンズ」中尉

「G. F. ブルウェット」氏

「ヘレン・J. ドウガル」姫

北郷爲雄 氏

「ハワード」氏ニヨル訊問

問、陸軍次官ニナル前アナタハ木村大將ト相互ニ公務上社會上或ハ政  
治的ニ何カ關係ガアツタノデスカ。

U 164 0002 1955

答、私ハ木村トハ社會的ヤ政治的ナ關係ハアリマセンドシタ。唯社  
的デモ政治的デモナイ公務方面デ關係ガアツタダケデス。

問、アナタガ次官ヲヤツテキル時ニ、木村ハ七ヶ月ノ間兵器局長ヲ  
ツテキタノデスカ。

答、ソウデス。

問、コノ間木村ハアナタト頻繁ニ交渉ガアリマシタカ。

答、ハイ、仕事ノ上デス。

問、ソノ當時木村ハドンナ事ヲ取扱ツテキタノデスカ。

答、兵器關係ノ技術的ナ稟柄ダケデス。

問、埼玉縣出身者ニヨル縣ノ軍派閥ガ軍部内ニアリマシタカ。

答、イヤ、ソンナモノハアリマセンデシタ。

問、埼玉縣出身ノ誰カ名ノ知レタ軍ノ長老ガ居リマシタカ。

「二」

答、ソウイツタ軍人派閥ニツイテハ、私ハ何モ知リマセンドシタ。木

問、木村ハ陸軍大學ノ卒業生達ト仕事ノ上ヤ社會的ナ方面デ何カ係リ

合ガアリマシタカ。

答、木村ハ陸大ノ卒業生トハ仕事ノ上デ關係ガアリマシタ。社會的ナ關係バアリマセタデシタ。

問、木村ハ何時力政治ヤ經濟ヤ外交ニ關心ヲモツタコトガアリマスカ。  
答、木村ハ政治、經濟或ヒハ外交ナドニハ關心ヲモツテキタ様子ハアリマセンデシタ。

問、木村ハ次官デアツタ時、色々ナ政策ヲ立テタリ、又ハ諸政策樹立ニ當ツテ助言ヲシタリシタコトガアリマスカ。

答、木村ハ何事モ私ノ命ニ從ツテ爲シ、御前會議ヤ連絡會議トモ無關係ニアリマシタ。昨日一十一月一日ノ冒頭頃述ニ當ツテ木村ガ御前會議ニ關係シテキタヤウニ云ハレテ辛マシタガアレハ間違ヒデス。

問、木村ハ次官ヲヤツテキタ時、ドンナ工合ニ陸軍大臣ヲ補佐シタノデスカ。

答、事務的ナ學柄ニ就テ技術的ニ補佐シタ、ケデス。

問、ドウシテ木村ハ近衛内閣カラ東條内閣ヘ次官トシテ留任サレタノデスカ

答、次官トイフモノハ普通内閣ガ變ツタカラトイツテ變ルモノデハアリマセン。ソレハ陸軍ノ内部的ナ事柄ハ、内閣ノ更迭ニハ何等左右サレルコトガナイカラデス。

問、木村ガ陸軍次官ノ職カラ離任サセラレタノハ何故デスカ。

答、木村ハ兵器技術ノ方面デノ權威者デ、ソノ外ニ次官トシテノ經驗モ有シテキタノデシテ、戰爭が始マルト兵器行政本部ガ設置サレ、ソノ本部ノ長トシテ木材ノヤウナ兵器技術ノ權威者ガ必要トナツタノデス木村ハ又陸軍ノ全般的ナ知識モ有シテキタノデソノヤウナ職ニハ最適デシタノデ、陸軍次官カラ兵器行政本部長ニ轉職サレタノデス。

問、何故木村ハ在緬甸軍ノ司令官ニ任命サレマシタカ。

答、私ハ夫レヲアマリハツキリト存ジマゼン。

問、陸軍次官ハ陸軍又ハ省内ノ何レカニ於テ職員ヲ雇傭シタリ解雇シタリスル權限ヲ持チマシタカ。

答、イ、エ持チマゼン。

問、陸軍次官ハ陸軍省ヨリノ訓令ニ服從シナイ陸軍内又ハ省内ノ者ヲ處

罰スル權能ヲ持ツテキマシタカ。

答、陸軍次官ハ其ノ權限ヲ持チマセん。

問、陸軍大臣ハ訓令ニ服從セザル者ニ對シ陸軍内及ビ陸軍省内ノ者ヲ處

罰スル權能ヲ持チマシタカ。

答、ハイ持チマシタ。

問、陸軍省ノ局長達ハ誰カヲ處罰シタリ免職シタリスル權限ヲ持ツテキ

マシタカ。

答、ハイ

問、支那ニ居ル陸軍ノ或ル將軍ガ陸軍省ヨリノ訓令ニ服從シナカツタト  
假定スレバ誰ガ彼ヲ免職サセタリ又ハ處罰スル權能ヲ持ツテ居ルノデ  
スカ。

答、免職スル權能ハ陸軍省ノ管掌中ニ有ルガ處罰スル權能ハ唯天皇ノ大  
權中ニアルノミデアリマス。天皇陛下ノ御裁可無シニ將官ヲ免職スル  
コトハ出來マゼン。

問、陸軍省内各局部ノ事務處理ニ關シテハ誰ガ陸相ニ對シテ直接ニ責任

U 164 0002 1959

Def. Doc. #. 626B - 1

ガ有リマスカ。

答、或ル場合ナ夫レハノ事務トノ次官ガ處理スルコトナシニ直接  
<http://www.eiga.com>

大臣ノトコロニ参リマスガ一般ニ次官ハ夫レヲ處理シナクレハナリマセん。然シ局部長達ハ彼等ノ事務處理ニ關シ直接陸軍大臣ニ對シテ責任ガ有リマス。

問、何ンナ具合ニ次官ハ局長間ノ事務ヲ處理シマシタカ  
答、概括的ニ申シマスト次官ハ局長間ノ摩擦ヲ除去スル目的デ種々ナル  
事務處理ノ予定ヲ取極メル機會ヲ附與サレテ居リマスガ、場合ニ依リ  
處理事項ハ局長カラ直接ニ陸相ノトコロヘ參リマシタ一一殊ニ人手  
ニ關シテ左様デアリマシタ。

問、各般ノ機制及ビ命令ガ陸相ノ命ニ依リ陸軍次官ニ依リ發令サレルハ習慣ダツタノデスカ。

答、ハイ、慣習トシテ行ハレマシタ一一正式ニハ或時ハ陸相ノ名ヲ以テスル時モアリ又時トシテハ次官ノ名ヲ以テ發令サレマシタ。之ハ都督軍事省外務省規定期定中ニアリマス。夫レハ命令發令ノ形式デアリマシテ總テ之

等處理事項ニ對シテ全責任ハ陸相ニ歸スルノデアリマス。

問、誰ガ重要ナル決裁ヲ行ヒマシタカ。

答、最モ重要ナルモノハ陸相ニ依リ決裁サレマシタ。

問、俘虜ニ關シテ陸軍次官ニ依リ發令セラレタル依命通牒ハ陸軍次官ニ

ヨラズ陸相ニ依ツテ決裁ガサレタ後ニ發令サレタモノデアリマスカ。

答、次官名ノ通牒ハ陸相決裁ノ後ニ發令サレタモノデス。俘虜取扱ニ關

スル通牒ハ陸相ニ依リ決裁セラレ次官名ヲ以テ發令サレマシタ。

問、木村ハ眞珠灣攻撃ノ計畫ニナニカ参加シマシタカ。

答、イエ致シマセンデシタ。

問、木村ハ其ノ攻擊ガ行ハレルコトニナツテ居タコトヲ通知サレマシタ  
力。

答、私ハ記憶致シマセン。

問、俘虜管理部長ハ其ノ部ノ職務ニ對シテ責任ガ有リマシタカ。

答、ハイ、夫レハ次官デハナクテ俘虜管理部長ノ責任デアリマシタ。

問、大麻<sup>ハシ</sup>ノ俘虜事項ハ次官ノ助力無シニ陸相及ビ局長ニ依ツテ決裁サレ

マシタカ。

答、夫等ハ俘虜管理部長ニ依リ決裁サレマシタ。問、木村ガ陸軍次官在任中各局長ハ陸軍大臣ニ對シ直接責任ヲ負フヲキマシタカ。

答、字義通リニ云フト局長等ハ陸軍大臣ニ直接責任ヲ負ツテ居マシタ。此レハ成文陸軍省官制ニ明ラカデアリマス。

問、陸軍次官ノ任務ハ何デシタカ。

答、陸軍大臣ハ指揮下ニ種々ナル事務上ノ技術的事項ニ處理シ、陸軍大臣ヲ補佐シ各局ノ事務ヲ監督スル事デアリマス。此レハ成文<sup>イ</sup>陸軍省官制ニ記載サレテアリマス。

問、宣務局ハ陸軍省ノ中核<sup>ハ</sup>アリ且陸軍省内ノ統制的立場デアリマシタカ。

答、各局ハ陸軍大臣ニ平等ニ從屬シテ居リマシタカラ、軍務局ガ陸軍省ノ中核ト云フ事ハ出來マセん然シ軍務局ハ豫算ヲ統制シ他ノ重要ナ事項ヲ管理スル事ガ出來マスカラ當然他ノ局ノ間ニアツテ非常ニ重要ナ地位ヲ占メテ居リマシタガ軍務局ガ陸軍省ノ中核デアツタト公式ニ云フ

事ハ出來マゼン

問、木村ガ陸軍次官ニ就任シタ際陸軍大臣・軍務局長ハ彼等ノ任務ニ關

問シタ事柄ニ就イテ充分知ツテ居リマシタカ。

答、此ノ質問ニハ私自身カラハ答ヘラレマゼンガ軍務局長ニ付テ云フ

彼ハ非常ニ有能デ且有爲ノ人デアリマシタ。  
間、木村ガ陸軍次官ニ就任シタ時局長達ハ有能デ且ツ自己ノ任務ヲ處理  
シ得ル能力ガアリマシタカ。

答、當然ソウデス。

問、木村ハ各局長ニソノ局ノ事柄ヲ何等干渉スルコトナク處理サセマシ  
タカ。

答、ハイ。

問、木村ガ陸軍次官ニ就任シタ時陸軍大臣、軍務局長及ビ他ノ局長等ハ

既ニ數ヶ月モソノ地位ニアリマシタカ。

答、ハイ。

問、軍務局長ハ陸軍省ノ對外交涉例ヘバ内閣ヤ參謀本部、海軍トノ交渉  
ヲ取扱ツタノデスカ。

答、モシ質問ガ各省間ノ連絡事務ト云フ意味ナラバ、ソウデアリマスガ

國內的及國際的ノ政策ト解釋サレルナラバ誤解ヲ生ジ易イ。

問、陸軍大臣ガ總理大臣ニ就任シタ後、彼ハソノ任務、權限及責任ヲ何

レカフ陸軍次官ニ委譲シマシタカ。

答、陸軍大臣ノ總理大臣就任後陸軍次官ノ權限及責任ハ全然影響サレマ  
センデシタ。

問、軍事參議官ノ地位ハ重要ナモノデアリマシタカ。

答、陸軍ニ於テハソレハ重要ナモクナリミテガ實際的ニハソレハ全然  
權力ヲ有シテ居リマゼン然シ天皇ニ對スル助言者デアリ從ツテ私ハソ  
レガ重要デナイト云フ學ハ出來マゼン社會的ニソレハ重要デアルガ實  
際ニハ權力ヲ持チマゼン。

問、陸軍省ハ作戰ヲ計畫又ハ實施シマシタカ。

答、イ、エ。

問、陸軍省ハ行政的事項ヲ取扱ヒマシタカ。

答、ムイ。

問、誰ガ陸軍省内將校ノ成績表ヲ作成シマシタカ。

答、擔任各局長デアリマス。

問、何レカノ省ノ前次官デ次官トシテノ行動カラ生ジタ罪ノ爲ニ裁判ヲ受ケタリ或ハ告發サレタモノガアリマスカ。

答、私ハ前次官ニツイテ何モ答ヘル事ガ出來マセん一般的ニ云ツテ私ハナカツタト思ヒマス少クトモ陸軍デハアリマセンデシタ。

問、木村ガ陸軍次官在任中彼ハ多クノ儀式ニ參列シマシタカ。

答、ハイ。

問、陸軍大臣ヤ各局長トノ會合ニ於テ、木村ハ積極的ナ役割ヲシマシタカ。

答、イ、エ木村ハ積極的ニハ出マセンデシタ陸軍次官ニハ何等私ヲ動かス力ハアリマセンデシタ。

問、陸軍大臣、陸軍次官及軍務局長ノ間デハ軍務局所管事項ノ大部分殊ニ政策ニ關スル事項ニ就テハ大臣ト局長間デ直接ニ學ヲ決メルト言フ申シ合ハセガアツタノデスカ。

Def. Doc. 4. 626B-1

答、公式ノ申シ合ハセハアリマセンデシタ然シ前ニ述ベマシタ通り草務

局長ハ陸軍大臣ニ對シ直接責任ヲ負フコトニナツテキマスノデ多クノ  
事項ヲ陸軍大臣ト直接ニ決定シマシタ。

問、木村ハ御前會議又ハ連絡會議ニ提出セラルベキ學項ノ準備又ハ計  
画ニ何等力關係ヲ有ツテキマシタカ。

答、關係アリマセンデシタ。

問、木村ハ右ノ諸會議ニ於テ行ハレタ事柄ニ就キ常ニ報告ヲ受ケテオリマ  
シタカ。

答、木村ハソレ等ノ會議ニハ何等關係シテオリマセンデシタ彼ガ報告ヲ  
受ケテキタカドウカ私ハ知リマセン。

一九四六年十一月二日附東條英機訊問書

通譯證明書

余、即チ北郷爲雄ハ宣誓ノ上與ヘラレタル問答ヲ英語ヨリ日本語ニ、又日本語ヨリ英語ニ夫々誤ナク翻譯シタルコト、及七頁ヨリ成ル右問答ノ當該記録ハ余ノ知リ且信ズル限りニ於テ直實ニシテ正確ナルモノナルコトヲ陳述ス。

北郷爲雄一署名一

右ノ者一九四六年十一月十八日余ノ面前ニ於テ宣誓シ且署名ス。

重大戰爭犯罪人辯護團調查官

陸軍歩兵中尉 ディヴィッド、W、バースンズ

Dof.Doc. #.626B-1

U 164 0002 1967

速記者證明書

私、即チヘレン、T、ドウグルハ上記訊問ニ際シ速記者トシテ行動シ  
上記ノ問答ヲ記録シタルコト及右記録ハ私ノ知リ且信ズル限り眞實ニ  
テ正確ナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

ヘレン、T、ドウグル（署名）

調査官證明書

余、即チ陸軍歩兵中尉第〇二四四四二九號デイヴィット、W、バースン  
ズハ東條英機ガ一九四六年十一月二日余ノ面前ニ出頭シ、通譯北郷爲雄  
（音譯）ノ通譯ニテソノ際發セラレタル各問ニ對シ上記ノ答ヲ爲シタル  
コトヲ證明ス。

重大戦争犯罪人辯護團調査官

陸軍歩兵中尉第〇二四四四二九號

デイヴィッド、W、バースンズ（署名）

於日本、東京

（場所）  
（日附）